Abstract-We consider the random linear precoder at the source node as a secure network coding. We prove that it is strongly secure in the sense of Harada and Yamamoto [23] and universal secure in the sense of Silva and Kschischang [35] , [36] , while allowing arbitrary small but nonzero mutual information to the eavesdropper. Our security proof allows statistically dependent and non-uniform multiple secret messages, while all previous constructions of weakly or strongly secure network coding assumed independent and uniform messages, which are difficult to be ensured in practice.
at the source node from network topology and coding at intermediate nodes is termed universal by Silva and Kschischang in [35] , [36] . They [35] also showed the existence of universal weakly secure network coding with more than two F q -symbols in S i , but have not shown an explicit construction.
Cai [6] removed most of drawbacks mentioned earlier. Cai proved that random linear network coding [26] gives the strongly secure network coding in the sense of [23] with arbitrarily high probability with sufficiently large finite fields. However, he did not provide evaluation of the required field size, and it seems huge. Moreover, for some applications (e.g. [9] , [39] ) we want to choose coding at intermediate nodes in non-random fashion.
There exists a common difficulty in all the previous constructions reviewed above. In practice, we are not sure if the multiple messages are uniform and statistically independent. However, all the previous studies 1 assumed the uniformity and the independence, and without both of them their security proofs do not seem to hold. It is important to provide a security proof for weakly and strongly secure network coding without uniformity or independence assumption. On the other hand, non-uniformity of secret messages has been considered in the ordinary secure network coding [10] , [40] (see also the survey [7] ). In [7] , [10] , [40] , the randomness to hide a secret message was assumed to be statistically independent of the secret message, while our present study allows it to be statistically dependent.
We shall analyze the security of a slightly modified construction of the random linear precoder originally proposed in [8] . Our modified construction is strongly secure in the sense of [23] and universal secure in the sense of [35] , [36] . Uniformity and the independence assumptions are required in previous works to guarantee security. This paper relaxed the assumptions and aims to determine the amount of information leakage if the two conditions are not satisfied. The optimality of our modified construction is verified under the uniformity and independence assumption at the end of Remark 10.
However, we relax an aspect of the security requirements traditionally used in the secure network coding. In previous proposals of secure network coding [3] , [8] , [23] , [35] , [36] it is required that the mutual information to the eavesdropper is exactly zero. We relax this requirement by regarding sufficiently small mutual information to be acceptable. This relaxation is similar to requiring the decoding error probability to be sufficiently small instead of strictly zero. Also observe that our relaxed criterion is much stronger than one commonly used in the information theoretic security [32] . Our modified construction can realize arbitrary small mutual information if coding over sufficiently many symbols in single packet is allowed.
Up to this point, we have followed the conventional usage of terminology "strong security" and "weak security" in secure network coding. On the other hand, in the context of key agreement and wiretap channel coding and "strong security"
and "weak security" mean completely different security criteria [4] . We shall introduce a different terminology "secure multiplex network coding" to mean "strong security" used in secure network coding.
After we submitted the original manuscript in 2012, one of the authors started and published another approach [30] to the same problem as this paper. [30] proposed a deterministic construction of universal secure multiplex network coding and its security analysis also valid for dependent and non-uniform multiple messages, while the proposed construction in this paper is probabilistic. However, when multiple messages are dependent or non-uniform, the construction and the security analysis in [30] cannot ensure the mutual information to the eavesdropper arbitrarily small, which makes the construction in [30] less useful for dependent or non-uniform messages. As far as the authors know, only the construction in the present paper can ensure arbitrarily small mutual information to the eavesdropper when multiple messages are dependent or nonuniform.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related results used in this paper, and a slightly new terminology "secure multiplex network coding". Section III introduces the strengthened version of the privacy amplification theorem and the proposed scheme for secure network coding. Section IV concludes the paper.
Part of this paper was reported as earlier proceedings papers [33] , [34] . We substantially rewrote our security proof in [34] so that we can analyze the security with dependent and nonuniform multiple secret messages, which was not done in [34] . We borrowed ideas from [33, Section IV] and extended them in Appendix B so that we can prove Lemma 5.
II. Preliminary

A. Model of network and network coding and two-universal hash functions
As in [3] , [8] , [11] , [23] , [35] , [36] we consider the single source multicast, and assume the linear network coding [29] , [31] . The source node is assumed to have at least n outgoing links. For i = 1, . . . , n, the source node generates a packet P i consisting of m symbols in F q , and transmits an F qlinear combination of P 1 , . . . , P n to each outgoing link, as explained in [18, Section 2.1]. At an intermediate node, only packets generated at the same time by the source node are linearly combined, as explained in [18, Section 2.5]. The linear combination coefficients at each node are fixed so that all the legitimate receivers can decode n packets P 1 , . . . , P n from the source node. In this paper, we assume that all of sink nodes have respective decoders to recover all of the nm transmitted symbols. Since all of legitimate receivers can recover the message without error due to this assumption, we do not need to discuss the decoding error probability, and focus on the security.
If the random linear network coding [26] is employed, we have to also include so-called encoding vectors in each packet P i [18, Section 2.2] . We ignore those encoding vectors because they do not carry secret information.
Hereafter, we shall only consider the eavesdropper Eve and forget about the multiple legitimate receivers. The n packets P 1 , . . . , P n carry in total mn symbols in F q . We shall propose a method encoding secret information into mn symbols by the source node. The mn symbols obtained by the proposed method are distributed to packets P 1 , . . . , P n .
Eve can eavesdrop µ links. We assume µ ≤ n throughout this paper. The total number of eavesdropped symbols is therefore mµ. The set of µ eavesdropped links is assumed to be fixed during packets P 1 , . . . , P n are traveling on the network, as assumed in [35] , [36] . The situation considered here also includes the conventional store-and-forward network as a special case.
We shall use a family of two-universal hash functions [12] for the privacy amplification theorem introduced later.
Definition 1: Let F be a set of functions from a finite set S 1 to another finite set S 2 , and F a random variable on F . If for any x 1 x 2 ∈ S 1 we have
then F with the probability distribution of F is said to be a family of two-universal hash functions.
B. Security definitions
In this subsection, we review the existing security criteria, and introduce our security criterion. We also discuss the relation among security criteria because the same terminology is used to mean different criteria.
Definition 2 (Strongly secure network coding): [23] Let m = 1, and S 1 , . . . , S T ∈ F q be messages with T ≤ n. We denote by S T +1 , . . . , S n ∈ F q randomness not intended as messages. A network coding is said to be η-strongly secure if the following relation holds for any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. When Eve's observation Z is obtained by eavesdropping µ links, any I ⊂ {1, . . . , T } with µ − η ≤ T − |I| satisfies
where S I = [S i : i ∈ I] and I(S I ; Z) denotes their mutual information as defined in [14] .
The parameter η is equivalent to k in [23] . Harada and Yamamoto [23] showed a procedure to construct (n − T )-strongly secure network coding under the uniformity and independence assumption on the messages S 1 , . . . , S n . Bhattad and Narayanan [3] introduced the weak security for network coding that requires I(S i ; Z) = 0 for all i ∈ I.
We want to consider the universal security studied in [35] , [36] , and also want to use multiple symbols in a single packet P i , that is, m > 1. So we introduce our version of universal strong security, by following the approach initiated by Silva and Kschischang [35] , [36] .
Definition 3: Assume that we are given a linear network coding for single source multicast. Assume also that linear coding at intermediate nodes and the set of µ eavesdropped links are fixed when packets P 1 , . . . , P n travel from the source node to all the legitimate receivers. Suppose that we have T +1 messages S 1 , . . . , S T +1 and S i ∈ F k i q . S T +1 denotes randomness not intended as a message. We assume
A linear transformation of S 1 , . . . , S T +1 at the source node is said to be a universal (ǫ, η)-secure multiplex network coding if the following relation holds for all linear coding at intermediate nodes and for any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. When Eve's observation Z corresponds to µ eavesdropped links, any subset I ⊂ {1, . . . ,
where
Readers may observed that the above secure multiplex network coding with ǫ = 0 is almost the same as the strong security in [23] . The reason for using a different name is as follows. In the study of wiretap channel coding, we usually consider a sequence of encoders and decoders for block length m = 1, 2, . . . . the weak security in the wiretap coding means lim m→∞ I(S , Z)/m = 0, where S is the message of the wiretap coding and Z is the received sequence by the eavesdropper. The strong security in the wiretap coding means lim m→∞ I(S , Z) = 0. Since those meanings of the weak and strong security in the wiretap coding are different from the secure network coding, we introduced a different terminology in Definition 3 to reduce unnecessary confusion.
III. Universal secure multiplex network coding
A. Strengthened privacy amplification theorem
In order to evaluate the mutual information to Eve when the sum rate of multiple secret information is large, we need to strengthen the privacy amplification theorem originally appeared in [2] , [25] as follows. The below new privacy amplification theorem enables an upper bound (8) on the mutual information when the mutual information grows with m instead of converging to zero.
The following proposition is a slightly enhanced version of [34, Theorem 2] .
Proposition 4: Let A 1 and A 2 be discrete random variables on finite sets A 1 and A, respectively, and F a family of functions from A 1 to A 3 . Let F be a random variable on F . Assume that A 1 and F are conditionally independent given A 2 , and that for any fixed realization a 2 of A 2 , the conditional probability distribution of F given a 2 satisfies the condition for a family of two-universal hash functions. Then we have
denotes the expectation of · with f being the random variable. We use the natural logarithm for all the logarithms in this paper, which include ones implicitly appearing in entropy and mutual information. Otherwise we have to adjust the above inequality.
Proof: Proof is given in Appendix A. In our analysis of the security, we shall use Proposition 4 with A 1 being the whole secret message, A 2 being part of the secret message whose secrecy we analyze, and F(A 1 ) being Eve's observation.
B. Description of the proposed scheme and analysis with randomized coding
The purpose of this section is to provide a universal (ǫ I , (k T +1 /m−δ ρ ))-secure multiplex network coding in the sense of Definition 3, where δ ρ is a parameter measuring conditional non-uniformity to be defined in Eq. (12) . The modified sense means that the zero mutual information in Eq. (2) is relaxed to the requirement that it can be made arbitrarily small. For this purpose, in this subsection, we treat the coding scheme with randomized coding. We assume that we have T secret messages, which can be dependent or non-uniform, and that the i-th secret message is given as a random variable S i whose realization is a row vector in F k i q . We shall provide upper bounds on the information leaked to Eve for all choices of values of k i . We shall also use a supplementary random message S T +1 taking values in F k T +1 q when the randomness in the encoder is insufficient to make S i secret from Eve. By S we denote the entire collection (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ) of messages. We assume mn = k 1 
Let L be the set of all bijective F q -linear maps from
q to itself, and L the uniform random variable on L statistically independent of S = (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ), and arbitrary fix nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }. The source node store LS t into packets P 1 , . . . , P n defined in Section II-A and send them via its n outgoing links, where t denotes the transpose of a vector. Our modified construction just adds a bijective linear precode to an existing network code. Note that attaching a random linear function was first proposed in [8] for the secure network coding. This coding scheme is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
The legitimate sender and all the legitimate receivers agree on the choice of L. The eavesdropper Eve may also know their choice of L. Choice of L is part of protocol specification, the chosen L is repeatedly used, and agreement on its choice among legitimate sender and receivers is not counted as consumption of the network bandwidth. A legitimate receiver can recover S 1 , . . . , S T , S T +1 by multiplying L −1 to his/her received information. By the assumption on Eve, her information can be expressed as BLS t by using an mµ × mn matrix B over F q as in [35] , [36] .
For the nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , T }, denote the collection of random variables [S i : i ∈ I] by S I , denote [S i : i ∈ {1, . . . , T + 1} \ I] by S I , and let k I = i∈I k i .
For a fixed realization ℓ of L, the information gained by Eve is measured by the mutual information I(S I ; BLS t |L = ℓ), which is common practice in the information theoretic security [5] , [32] 
From Eq. (4) we have
Fix a real number C 1 > 1. Equation (5) and the Markov inequality yield that
This means that there is at least a probability of 1−(2
for all the (2 T − 1) nonempty subsets I of {1, . . . , T }. Defining another subset L I,2 := {ℓ | exp(ρI(S I ; BLS t |L = ℓ)) > C 1 E ℓ [exp(ρI(S I ; BLS t |L = ℓ))]}, by Eq. (4) and the Markov inequality we obtain
Therefore, a realization ℓ of L satisfies both Eq. (6) and
with probability at least 1 − 2 × (2 T − 1)/C 1 . Equation (7) implies
(by Eq. (7))
where in Eq. (8) we used ln(1 + exp(x)) ≤ |1 + x| + = max{0, 1 + x}.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 6: Recall that the eavesdropping mµ×mn matrix B is fixed, that L is the uniform random variable on L statistically independent of S = (S 1 , . . . , S T +1 ), and that a real number C 1 > 1 is arbitrarily fixed. There is at least a probability of 1 −2 ×(2 T −1)/C 1 such that information leakage
Eve Fig. 1 . Proposed coding scheme for the universal secure multiplex network coding I(S I ; BLS t |L = ℓ) to Eve with the chosen realization ℓ of L satisfies both inequalities (6) and (8) simultaneously.
The previous proposition does not ensure the universal security in the sense of [35] , [36] because it only considers a fixed eavesdropping matrix B. To ensure the universal security, we must consider all the possible eavesdropping matrix B, which shall be done in the next two subsections.
C. Evaluation of the number of different kinds of eavesdropping
In the following, we considered the case when the matrix B corresponds to µ eavesdropped links. Such a case can be mathematically formulated as follows. Let x i, j ∈ F q be the jth symbol in the i-th packet P i defined in Section II-A. Then there exists a µ × n matrix B µ×n such that what are observed by Eve at the j-th symbols in her eavesdropped µ packets is expressed as B µ×n (x 1, j , . . . , x n, j ) t for j = 1, . . . , m. Without loss of generality we may assume rank(B µ×n ) = µ because if rank(B µ×n ) = µ ′ < µ then such a case can be regarded as only µ ′ links being eavesdropped. Then, the mµ × mn matrix 2 B is completely determined by B µ×n .
In order to show the universal security in Definition 3, we need to ensure that the mutual information is small for any B and any 0 ≤ µ ≤ n. For this purpose, we need to count the number of different kinds of eavesdropping.
We consider the set B(µ) of all possible mµ × mn matrices B that characterize Eve's eavesdropping with the above restriction. Then, we define an equivalence relation ∼ on B(µ)
LS t for all L and S t . That is, B 1 ∼ B 2 if and only if the kernel of B 1 is the same as that of B 2 . Since B 1 and B 2 are determined by µ × n matrices, the space B(µ)/ ∼ is the set of the (n − µ)-dimensional subspaces in F n q . The space is called Grassmannian and the number is evaluated in the following way [17] 
because (x − z)/(y − z) is monotonically increasing in z when x > y > z > 0. The final inequality follows from the inequality 2 Mathematically, the mµ × mn matrix B is written as B µ×n ⊗ I m×m .
2 . Hence, the total number of equivalence classes excluding B(0) is upper bounded as
D. Universally secure multiplex network coding Next, using the above discussion, we show the existence of universal secure multiplex networking coding. Due to (10) , the probability of L satisfying Eqs. (6) and (8) simultaneously for all possible B is at least
Recall that chosen L is part of protocol specification and repeatedly used. Because Eqs. (6), (8) and (11) are independent of realization of the random variable S representing secret information, Eqs. (6) and (8) are satisfied in every repeated use of L with probability at least Eq. (11).
The upper bound (6) can go to either zero or ∞ as m → ∞. When the upper bound (6) goes to ∞, the information leakage to Eve grows linearly with m and its growth rate with m will be analyzed by Eq. (8) . Firstly, we need to clarify under what condition Eq. (6) converges to zero as m → ∞. To do so, we shall introduce a version of conditional Rényi entropy introduced in [25] . There seems to be no standard definition for the conditional Rényi entropy, for example, definitions in [2] and [22] disagree and our definition in [25] is different from [2] , [22] . For discrete random variables X, Y, define conditional Rényi entropy of order 1 + ρ as
For ρ = 0, we define H 1 (X|Y) as lim ρ→0 H 1+ρ (X|Y). By using l'Hôpital's rule we see that H 1 (X|Y) is equal to the conditional Shannon entropy. Observe also that H 1+ρ (X|Y) = log q |X| if X is conditionally uniform given Y, where X denotes the alphabet of X. We note that E[P S I |S I (S I |S I ) ρ ] = e H 1+ρ (S I |S I ) . In order to clarify under what condition Eq. (6) converges to zero, we need to assume some knowledge on P S I |S I (S I |S I ). We consider the situation in which each message S i originates from a different organization and it is compressed before network coded. Even after compression, it is known that S 1 , . . . , S T are not completely uniform [24] , and we must allow certain degree of statistical dependence among S 1 , . . . , S T and their non-uniformity. In this paper we consider secure network coding separately from source coding of S i . Let δ ρ be a nonnegative constant such that
for some 0 < ρ ≤ 1, for all I, and for sufficiently large m.
Observe that if all messages S i 's are uniform and independent then δ ρ = 0. The parameter δ ρ captures the deviation from the uniform and independent situation in terms of conditional Rényi entropy per the number m of symbols in single packet. By taking the natural logarithm of Eq. (6), we see ln [RHS of Eq. (6)]
When
( * ) in Eq. (13) 
We see that we can make the upper bound Eq. (8) on
by letting m be large.
Observe that the assumption (14) is equivalent to the assumption of Definition 3 with η = k T +1 /m − δ ρ . By summarizing the previous discussion, we can construct a universal secure multiplex network coding in the sense of Definition 3 as follows:
Theorem 7: For any ǫ p , ǫ I > 0 and sufficiently large m, a random choice of mn × mn matrix L gives with probability at least 1 − ǫ p a universal (ǫ I , k T +1 /m − δ ρ )-secure multiplex network coding.
Remark 8: The condition (14) for almost zero mutual information can become true for µ = 1 if δ ρ < n − k I m − 1, which is equivalent to H 1+ρ (S I |S I )/(m ln q) > 1. A sufficient condition for (14) to hold for µ = 1 is that the conditional Rényi entropy of S I given S I is > ln q for some ρ, which is equivalent to S I has at least one F q symbol of conditional randomness given S I . So we can see that the previous argument can ensure almost zero mutual information with messages very far from independence and uniformity.
Remark 9:
The meaning of C 1 is as follows: At Eqs. (4) and (5), there might not exist a realization ℓ of L that satisfies Eqs. (4) and (5) for all subsets I of {1, . . . , T } simultaneously. By sacrificing the tightness of the upper bounds, we ensure the existence of ℓ satisfying Eqs. (6) and (7) for all I.
Remark 10: Under the assumption that all messages S 1 , . . . , S T +1 are uniform and independent, the mutual information can be made exactly zero for every eavesdropping matrix B. The reason is as follows: For fixed B and L = ℓ, we have
The first term H(S I |L = ℓ) is an integer multiple of ln q since S I is assumed to have the uniform distribution. Let α I be the projection from
For fixed B and ℓ, and a given realization z of BℓS t , the set of solutions s such that z = Bℓs is written as ker(Bℓ)+ some vector v. This means that the set of possible candidates of S I given realization z of BℓS t is written as α I (ker(Bℓ)) + α I (v), and S I given realization z is uniformly distributed on α I (ker(Bℓ)) + α I (v). Since the cardinality of α I (ker(Bℓ)) + α I (v) is independent of ℓS t for fixed B and ℓ, the second term H(S I |BLS t , L = ℓ) is also an integer multiple of ln q. Therefore, if Eq. (6) holds for every B as verified in Eq. (11) and the RHS of Eq. (6) is < ln q, then the LHS of Eq. (6) must be zero. Observe that under this assumption our modified construction is a universal (0, k T +1 /m)-secure multiplex network coding in the exact sense of Definition 3. The parameter k T +1 /m is optimal according to [7] .
E. Evaluation of the required resource
In this subsection, we evaluate the amount of required resource in our proposal. One can make convergence of Eq. (6) arbitrarily slow by decreasing the difference between LHS and RHS of Eq. (14), which makes evaluation of required size of m very difficult.
To overcome the above difficulty, we consider (ǫ I , k T +1 /m − δ ρ − ǫ µ )-secure multiplex network coding, with which we have to ensure small mutual information only for µ < n − k I /m − δ ρ − ǫ µ . This assumption makes the difference between LHS and RHS of Eq. (14) at least ǫ µ , which enables us to provide an upper bound on m.
Proposition 11: For given n, q, T , ρ, δ ρ , ǫ I , ǫ p and ǫ µ ,
is sufficient to ensure that a random choice of L gives an (ǫ I , k T +1 /m − δ ρ − ǫ µ )-secure multiplex network coding with probability at least 1 − ǫ p . Proof: By Eq. (11) we have to choose C 1 with
By Eq. (13), to make the mutual information ≤ ǫ I , we see ln
We comment on the required field size and the computational complexity of code construction of our proposal and previous proposals realizing the security. The proposed construction works with any given field size q, as well as [30] , [35] . The required sizes of q in [3] , [23] are not explicitly given but they seem quite large.
Instead of increasing q, we need to increase m to satisfy the maximum allowable mutual information to the eavesdropper, as shown in Proposition 11. Proposition 11 indicates that a small value of ǫ µ makes the required size of m large, because smaller ǫ µ makes the convergence of Eq. (6) slower. In [35] , m ≥ n is sufficient for explicit construction of a code, and in [30] m ≥ 2n is sufficient, while neither [30] , [35] realizes almost zero mutual information with dependent or non-uniform multiple messages.
The complexity of code construction of our proposal is m 2 n 2 because of the random choice of mn × mn matrix. The codes in [30] , [35] are the Gabidulin codes [21] of length n over F q m and construction of an encoding matrix at the source node can be done in m 2 n 2 arithmetic operations in F q . We note that for small ǫ µ the required size of m in our proposal can be much larger than [30] , [35] . The complexities of code constructions in [3] , [23] are not given but they seem quite large.
F. Numerical example of explicit computation of required block size m
In this section we give a numerical example of computing required block length m in order to ensure the mutual information is below some value. In order to do so, we need an estimate of E[P S I |S I (S I |S I ) ρ ]. We assume to have δ 0.5 = 0.5 in Eq. (12) at ρ = 0.5.
Let q = 256, n = 10, µ = 3, T = 5, k i = 2m for all i. We do not have S T +1 . We want to ensure that we choose ℓ with probability at least 1−10 −12 such that I(S i ; BLS t |L = ℓ) < 10 By using δ ρ , we can upper bound the RHS of Eq. (6) as follows: (12)). (19) In order to keep the above upper bound to be below 10 −6 we have to choose can be identified with an element in F q mn , and multiplication by a nonzero element in F q mn is an F q -linear mapping and can be identified with an element in L. Let L F q mn be a commutative subgroup of L whose elements can be identified with nonzero elements in F q mn . By looking at the proof of Lemma 5 in Appendix B, we can see that L F q mn can be used in place of L in our modified construction. Necessary storage space to record choice of an element in L F q mn is that of mn F q symbols and is smaller than that of L. Matrix multiplication by an element in L F q mn is at least as fast as that in L.
IV. Conclusion
In the secure network coding, there was loss of information rate due to inclusion of random bits at the source node. Weakly and strongly secure network coding [3] , [6] , [23] , [35] remove that loss of information rate by using multiple messages to be kept secret from an eavesdropper, which require huge computational complexity in code construction or huge finite field size. In addition to this, the previous studies assumed uniform and independent multiple messages, which seems too strong assumption in practice. In this paper, we have shown that random linear transform of multiple messages at the source node realizes the strongly secure (called secure multiplex network coding in this paper) network coding with arbitrary high probability with sufficiently large block length. We did not assume uniformity nor independence in multiple messages. Our numerical example in Section III-F showed that "sufficiently large block length" can be small. We studied the secure network coding from separately the source coding of messages. Joint source and network coding might improve the performance, but we leave the study of such a joint encoding as a future.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 4
In order to show Proposition 4, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 13: Under the same assumption as Proposition 4, we have
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof of Lemma 13: Fix a 2 ∈ A 2 . The concavity of x
For a fixed realization a 2 of A 2 , by the assumption in Proposition 4 two random variables F and A 1 are statistically independent, which implies the distribution of f in (**) is independent of a 1 . Since f is chosen from a family of twouniversal hash functions defined in Definition 1, we have P(a
Since any two positive numbers x and y satisfy (x+y) ρ ≤ x ρ +y ρ for 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, we have
By Eqs. (21) and (22) we can see
Taking the average over A 2 of the both sides of the last equation, we have 
By Eqs. (23) and (24) 
